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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This action is an appeal from a decision rendered by the 
Seventh Judicial District Court on a Petition For Review of a 
Final Determination made by the Director of the Utah Department 
of Health on a medicaid application. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a~3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether federal and state statutes and regula-
tions mandate that a State Medical Assistance 
Program may not include the income of any re-
lative, except that of a parent or spouse, in 
the calculation of a child applicant's eligi-
bility for Medicaid benefits. 
Whether federal law and regulation are violated 
by any Medicaid eligibility calculation which 
deems Social Security benefits which are paid 
through a representative payee to be available 
to any person but the specific beneficiary. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17(D): 
A State plan for medical assistance must... 
include reasonable standards (which shall be 
comparable for all groups and may, in ac-
cordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income 
levels, but only in the case of applicants 
or recipients of assistance under the plan 
who are not receiving aid or assistance 
under any plan of the State approved under 
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title 
IV, [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 
1351 et seq., 1381 et seq.], based on the 
variations between shelter costs in urban 
areas and in rural areas) for determining 
eligibility for and the extent of medical 
assistance under the plan which... do not 
take into account the financial responsi-
bility of any individual for any applicant 
or recipient of assistance under the plan 
unless such applicant or recipient is such 
individual's spouse or such individual's 
child who is under 21 or (with respect to 
States eligibile to participate in the 
State program established under title XVI 
[42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is 
blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 
[42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States 
which are not eligible to participate in 
such program); and provide for flexibility 
in the application of such standards with 
respect to income by taking into account, 
except to the extent prescribed by the 
Secretary, the costs (whether in the form 
of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred 
for medical care or for any other type of 
remedial care recognized under State law;... 
42 U.S.C. §603(a) (38): 
A State plan for aid and service to needy 
families with children must- ... 
(38) provide that in making the determination 
under paragraph (7) with respect to a depen-
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dent child and applying paragraph (8), the 
State agency shall (except as otherwise pro-
vided in this part [42 USCS §§601 et seq.]) 
include-
(A) any parent of such childf and 
(B) any brother or sister of such childr if 
such brother or sister meets the conditions 
described in clauses (1) and (20 of section 
406(a) [42 USCS §606(a)]r if such parent, 
brother, or sister is living in the same 
home as the dependent child, and any income 
of or available for such parent, brother, or 
sister shall be included in making such deter-
mination and applying such paragraph with 
respect to the family (notwithstanding sec-
tion 205(j) [42 USCS §405(j)], in the case 
of benefits provided under title II [42 USCS 
§§401 et seq.]); and 
42 C.F.R. §435.113: 
The agency must provide Medicaid to indi-
viduals who would be eligible for AFDC 
except for an eligibility requirement used 
in that program that is specifically pro-
hibited under title XIX. 
42 C.F.R. §435.692(a)(1) and (2): 
(a) Except for a spouse of an individual 
or a parent for a child who is under 
age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency 
must not-
(1) Consider income and resources of any 
relative available to an individual; nor 
(2) Collect reimbursement from any relative 
for amounts paid by the agency for 
services provided to an individual. 
U.C.A. §26-18-3(2): 
The department [Department of Health] shall 
be the single state agency responsible for 
the administration of the medicaid program in 
connection with the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title 
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XIX of the Social Security Act. (2) The 
department shall develop implementing policy 
in conformity with the requirements of Title 
XIX and with regulations adopted pursuant 
thereto by the federal agency. 
Utah DSS-APA Manual, Vol. IIIf §327.32: 
1• Count the income of the parents and the child 
when the child lives with his parents. This 
includes children in non-AFDC foster care that 
have been placed in their own homes (see Sec. 
213.5) . 
For B, and D cases, a child is 
considered living with his parents 
until the month after he moves. 
For F and C cases, a child is 
considered living with his parents 
while temporarily absent from the 
home, such as for school, vacation, 
summer employment, medical treatment, 
etc. 
2. Count only the income of the child, including 
support payments made by the parents, in the^e 
situations: 
F and C Cases - when the child is living 
away from his parents and it is not 
temporary. 
a. This includes a child in Foster Care that 
has not been placed back in his own home 
(see Sec. 213.5). 
b. This includes a child in AFDC foster care, 
no matter where he lives. 
c. This includes a child living with a speci-
fied relative, and it is not temporary. 
B and D cases - when the child lives separate 
from his parents - for any reason. A child is 
considered living with his parents until the 
month after he moves. 
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42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2): 
(1) When it appears to the Secretary that the in-
terest of an applicant entitled to a payment would 
be served thereby, certification of payment may be 
mader regardless of the legal competency or incom-
petency of the individual entitled thereto, either 
for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use 
and benefit to a relative or some other person. 
(2) Any certification made under paragraph (1) for 
payment to a person other than the individual en-
titled to such payment must be made on the basis of 
an investigation, carried out either prior to such 
certification or within forty-five days after such 
certification, and on the basis of adequate evidence 
that such certification is in the interest of the 
individual entitled to such payment (as determined 
by the Secretary in regulations). The Secretary 
shall insure that such certification are adequately 
reviewed. 
42 U.S.C. §408(e): 
Whoever... (e) having made application to receive 
payment under this title for the use and benefit of 
another and having received such a payment, 
knowingly and willfully converts such a payment, 
or any party thereof, to a use other than for 
the use and benefit of such other person; ... 
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
thereof shall be fined not more than $5000 or im-
prisoned for not more than five years, or both. 
42 U.S.C. §1302: 
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices, respectively, shall make and publish such 
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with 
this Act, as may be necessary to the efficient 
administration of the functions with which each 
is charged under this Act. 
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20 C.F.R. §404.2035(a): 
A representative payee has a responsibility to-
la) Use the payments he or she receives only for 
the use and benefit of the beneficiary in a man-
ner and for the purposes he or she determines, 
under the guidelines in this subpart, to be in 
the best interests of the beneficiary;.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 30, 1986, a Petition For Review was filed in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court requesting that the Final Deter-
mination of the Director of the Utah Department of Health, whicl 
denied Medicaid benefits to Jerry Grandson, be reversed as ar-
bitrary and capricious for having ignored federal and state lawi 
and regulations. (C.T. pp. 1-17) On June 23, 1986, the Directo 
moved to dismiss the Petition. (C.T. pp. 18-19) On July 7 
1986, the District Court entered an Order denying the Motion T 
Dismiss. (C.T. pp. 38-39) 
On July 14, 1986, the Director filed an Answer to th 
Petition (C.T. pp. 40-42) and a Certification Of Transcript 
Papers, And Documents. (C.T. pp. 47-79.) On August 13, 1986 
Jerry Grandson filed a Memorandum Of Points and Authorities I 
Support Of Petition For Review. (C.T. pp 80-89.) On Septembc 
16, 1986, the Director filed her Reply Memorandum. (C.T. pp. 1( 
- 129.) 
On September 12, 1986, the Director moved for leave i 
file a third-party complaint against the Secretary of the Unit 
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States Department of Health and Human Services. (C.T. pp. 90-
91.) On November 11, 1986, the District Court denied the motion. 
(C.T. pp. 169-170.) 
On February 12, 1987, Jerry Grandson requested a ruling 
on the Petition (C.T. pp. 191-192) On February 23, 1986, the 
District Court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the Petition 
to reverse the Final Determination of the Director. (C.T. pp. 
193-194.) The Decision was formalized in the Order of March 30, 
1987. (C.T. pp. 201-202.) 
On March 23, 1986, Jerry Grandson filed a Notice Of Ap-
peal. (C.T. pp. 196-197.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1985, Jerry Grandson applied for medical assistance 
under the state Medicaid plan. Jerry Grandson's household is 
composed of 5 members: his mother, sister, two nieces adopted by 
his mother, and himself. (C.T. pp. 70-71) As one or both parents 
of these children is deceased, each child in the household is a 
recipient of Social Security Survivor benefits. Jerry Grandson's 
personal benefits total about $158.00 per month. (C.T. p. 69) 
On July 25, 1985, the District VII (B) Office of Com-
munity Operations denied Jerry Grandson's application on the 
ground that the total income available to meet Petitioner's medi-
cal obligation is in excess of $666.00: the basic maintenance 
standard for a household of five. (C.T. p.75.) In arriving at 
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this determination, the District Office deemed as available in-
come both Jerry Grandson's Social Security benefits and also 
those Social Security benefits received by his sister and two 
nieces. (C.T. p. 74) 
Jerry Grandson submitted a written appeal of this denial 
to Administrative Hearing Officer Neal Bernson to contest the 
decision by the District Office. (C.T. pp. 62-68, 76-77) The 
appeal argued that deeming of benefits belonging to Jerry 
Grandson's sister and nieces as being available as income to hiir 
violated federal law and regulations which preclude such deeming. 
The appeal also pointed out that such deeming was inconsistent 
with Utah Assistance Payments Administration regulations. 
Finally, the Hearing Officer was advised that, because the Socia] 
Security Survivor's benefits were paid to Nellie Grandson, 
Jerry's mother, as a representative payee, any use of benefits 
received for his nieces and sister to pay for Jerry's medica 
bills would be contrary to federal law. 
On December 20, 1985, the administrative Hearing Of 
ficer, although refusing to address any legal arguments raised b 
Jerry Grandson (C.T. p.60.), sustained the District Office' 
decision. (C.T. pp. 53-60.) The Recommended Decision of the ad 
ministrative Hearing Officer was adopted by the Director of th 
Utah Department of Health, Suzanne Dandoy, in her Final Deter 
mination dated March 14, 1986. (C.T. pp. 48-52.) 
The Director's Final Determination addressed the legal 
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issues previously ignored by the hearing officer. The Determina-
tion stated that the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ("DEFRA", 
below), P.L. 98-369, §2640, required the Department of Health to 
count the income of Jerry Grandson's siblings as being available 
to him in determining his medicaid eligibility. (C.T. p. 51.) 
However, in explaining what she termed "the whole law", the 
Director did not deal with the problem that DEFRA only amended 
Title IV of the Social Security Act, and left unchanged the 
provision against deeming of relatives' income found in Title XIX 
(Medicaid) of the Act. In addressing the problem of repre-
sentative payee status, the Director again relied on DEFRA, 
pointing out that the changes made in the Title IV (Aid To 
Families With Dependent Children) eligibility statute also 
abolished the representative payee bar to deeming sibling income 
as available in AFDC cases. (C.T. pp. 50-51.) However, other 
than to state that "the whole law" mandated the same abolition 
for Medicaid cases, the Director did not explain how DEFRA had 
altered Title XIX, which Congress did not amend. 
On May 30, 1986, Jerry Grandson filed a Petition For 
Review in the Seventh Judicial District Court which alleged that 
the decision of the Department of Health concerning calculation 
of the income available to a child Medicaid applicant violated 
certain federal and state laws and regulations, and was therefore 
arbitrary and capricious. (C.T. pp. 1-3.) On February 23, 1987, 
the District Court entered a Memorandum Decision holding that the 
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income calculation was correct under existing law and regulation 
and denying the petition to alter the Final Determination of tfc 
Department of Health. (C.T. pp. 193-195.) 
Specifically, the Court stated..."that no particular lc 
or regulation should be isolated and treated as the final word, 
in a Medicaid eligibility determination, and thereby sustain* 
the Director's action of utilizing the DEFRA amendments to AFI 
eligibility to alter eligibility under the unamended Medica 
statutes and regulations. An Order to this effect was signed ai 
entered on March 30, 1987. (C.T. pp. 201-202.) 
Jerry Grandson filed his Notice Of Appeal on March 2 
1987. (C.T. pp. 196-197.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant, Jerry Grandson, applied for Medica 
benefits, under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. T 
Medicaid program is administered by the Utah Department 
Health. In determining Jerry's eligibility, the Social Securi 
Survivor's benefits income received by Jerry, two nieces, and I 
sister were deemed to be available to him as resources to co\ 
his medical expenses. This totalling of income rendered Jej 
ineligible for Medicaid benefits. The Director of the Departm< 
of Health upheld this determination by stating that the Defi< 
Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) mandated that the income of s 
lings be counted in both AFDC cases, under Title IV of the Soc 
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Security Act, and in Medicaid cases under Title XIX of the Act. 
This determination ignored an unamended section of Title XIX (42 
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17) (D)) which bars state agencies from counting 
sibling income in Medicaid eligibility determinations. The 
Director's decision also ignored federal regulations (42 C.F.R. 
§§ 435.113 and 435.602(a)(1) and (2)) which bar the counting of 
sibling income in Medicaid eligibility determinations. Finally, 
by ignoring these federal statutes and regulations, the Director 
circumvented Utah law (U.C.A. §26-18-3(2)) which requires that 
the Department of Health obey federal law in the administration 
of its Medicaid program. The Director's decision represents a 
sweeping and unauthorized expansion of amendments to Title IV of 
the Social Security Act into an alteration of Title XIX 
eligibility law. In making this expansion, unambiguous federal 
law barring the counting of sibling income was ignored, and the 
Director's determination was therefore arbitrary and capricious. 
The Medicaid eligibility determination upheld by the 
Director essentially held that the Social Security Survivor's 
benefits of Jerry Grandson's siblings were available to meet his 
financial obligations for medical treatment. These benefits are 
paid to Nellie Grandson, Jerry's mother, as a representative 
payee. Federal law and regulation (42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2), 
42 U.S.C. §408(e), and 20 C.F.R. §404.2035(a)) make it unlawful 
for a representative payee to use monies received by them for the 
obligations of any person other than the actual beneficiary. The 
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Director's determination thus forces the representative payee to 
violate federal law. The Director relies on DEFRA to justify 
this result, noting that the bar was waived in Title IV 
eligibility determinations. But DEFRA has no effect on Title XI? 
(Medicaid) eligibility standards, and the bar against allowinc 
representive payments to be used for persons other than the ac-
tual beneficiary has not been lifted in Medicaid cases. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS DICTATE 
THAT THE INCOME OF SIBLINGS AND OTHER RELATIVES, 
EXCEPT THAT OF PARENTS OR SPOUSE, MAY NEVER BE 
DEEMED AS AVAILABLE TO A CHILD-APPLICANT FOR MEDI-
CAID BENEFITS IN A DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICANT'S 
ELIGIBILITY. 
Section 1396a(a)(17)(D), of Title 42, United State 
Code, mandates that a State plan for medical assistance, i 
determining the eligibility of an individual for Medicai 
benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 
...[may] not take into account the finan-
cial responsibility of any individual for 
any applicant or recipient of assistance 
under the plan unless such applicant or 
recipient is such individual's spouse or 
such individual's child.... (Emphasis 
supplied) 
This statute has never been amended by Congress. 
Consistent with the terms of this statute, the Code 
Federal Regulations, at §435.602(a) (1) and (2), of Title 42, ( 
a section entitled "Limitation on the financial responsibility 
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relatives") states 
[e]xcept for a spouse of an individual or 
a parent for a child who is under age 21... 
the agency must not - (1) consider income 
and resources of any relative available 
to an individual; nor (2) collect reimburse-
ment from any relative for amounts paid... 
to any individual. (Emphasis supplied.) 
This regulation is clearly set out to enforce the 
limitation of 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D). The regulation has 
never been altered by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices. 
Utah is obliged to follow federal law and regulation in 
its implementation of the medical assistance program. U.C.A. 
§26-18-3(2). Utah's Department of Health has codified its 
eligibility rules for the Medicaid program in its DSS-APA Manual. 
Volume IIIf §327.32 of the Manual instructs eligibility workers 
that, in determining the income of an unemancipated childf to 
only ,f[c]ount the income of the parents and the child." This 
provision is an unambigous restatement of the federal statute and 
regulations. 
In summary, valid federal and state statutesf regulation 
and rules consistently mandate that a state agency making 
Medicaid eligibility determinations may never count the income of 
a relativef such as a brotherf sister, or niece, as being avail-
able to a child-applicant. 
Federal and state agencies (as is true in the present 
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case) have adopted the position that in determining the Medicaid 
eligibility of children, state agencies must apply the financial 
eligibility requirements of the State's Aid to Families With De-
pendent Children (A.F.D.C.) plan. Under the amendments to Title 
IV of the Social Security Act (covering A.F.D.C), made by the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (D.E.F.R.A.) P.L. 98-369, §2640, ar 
eligibility determination for a dependent child must count income 
available to a brother or sister. 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(38). Tin 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, ii 
reliance of the change made by DEFRA, has also required stat< 
agencies to count sibling income in any determination o: 
eligibility for Medicaid benefits under Title XIX. The federa 
and state agencies have argued that this interpretation of DEFR 
by the Secretary is entitled to such great weight as to be dis 
positive of the issue of the conflicting statutes and regula 
tions. 
The problems with this position are readily apparent 
Through DEFRA, Congress may have expressed its intent to amen 
eligibility requirements for AFDC benefits under Title IV of tlr 
Social Security Act, but it expressed no similar intent to chanc 
any part of Title XIX of the Act dealing with Medicaid benefits 
Indeed, §1396a(a)(17)(D) is still a viable and unamended sectic 
of Title XIX and clearly denies the states any right to inclu< 
relatives1 income (other than that of a spouse or parent) 
eligibility determinations. And, although the Secretary's i 
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terpretation of statutes are entitled to some weight, he cannot 
ignore clear statutory authority absolutely barring his inter-
pretation. The Secretary's interpretation, in any event, ignores 
the Secretary's own regulations, which state at 42 C.F.R. 
§435.113 
[t]he agency must provide Medicaid to indi-
viduals who would be eligible for AFDC except 
for an eligibility requirement used in that 
program that is specifically prohibited under 
Title XIX. (Emphasis supplied) 
Every decision, except the present one from the Seventh 
Judicial District, has rejected the position of the federal and 
state agencies and upheld the plain meaning of §1396a(a)(17)(D). 
In Vance v. Hegstrom (1986 9th Cir.) 793 F.2d 1018, the Ninth 
Circuit observed of DEFRA 
[t]he statute finally enacted by Congress 
which required states to include sibling 
income when determining AFDC eligibility 
is directed solely to the provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. §602, which is a component 
of the AFDC statute, and not to subsection 
(17)(D). (Emphasis supplied.) 
Id.r at p. 1025. The Court also held that the Secretary's inter-
pretative authority was not unlimited and, in setting eligibility 
standards, section 1396a (a) (17) (D) could not be ignored. M., at 
p.1024. Other courts have made identical holdings, all of which 
bar the counting of relatives' income. Reed v. Blizinger (S.D. 
Ind. 1986) 639 F.Supp. 130; Olson v. Reagen (S.D. Iowa 1986) 631 
F.Supp. 154; Gibson v. Puett (M.D. Tenn. 1985) 630 F.Supp. 542; 
17 
Malloy v. Eichler (D.Del. 1986) 628 F.Supp. 582; Sandberg v. Man-
sour (W.D. Mich. 1986) 627 F.Supp. 616; Childress v. Heckle 
(D.Colo. Jan. 13f 1986) No. 85-7-1459. 
The law on this matter is unambiguous: a state agenc 
is absolutely barred from counting the income of a brother 
sister, or niece as being available to an unemancipated child 
applicant for Medicaid benefits. The Final Determination of th 
Director of the Department of Health upheld the inclusion of in 
come from Jerry Grandson's sister and nieces in the assessment o 
his eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Such inclusion is done i 
violation of federal and state statutes and regulations. TY 
final Determination of the Director is therefore arbitrary ai 
capricious and must be reversed. 
II. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS PAID TO A REPRE-
SENTATIVE PAYEE MAY ONLY BE USED FOR THE 
ACTUAL BENEFICIARYf AND STATE MEDICAID 
PLANS MAY NOT DEEM SUCH INCOME PAID TO 
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A SIBLING AS BEING 
AVAILABLE TO AN APPLICANT FOR MEDICAID 
BENEFITS. 
The Social Security Act permits the Secretary of Heal 
and Human Services to appoint a trustee to receive benefits 
behalf of a beneficiary, to be used in the interest of th 
beneficiary. 42 U.S.C. §405 (j) . This trustee is termed 
"representative payee". Title 20, section 404.2035(a), of t 
Code of Federal Regulations, states that a representative pay 
must 
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"use the payments...she receives only for 
the use and benefit of the beneficiary 
in a manner and for the purposes...she 
determines...to be in the best interests 
of the beneficiary;...." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Section 408(e) of Title 42, makes it a felony to use the benefits 
paid to a representative payee for anyone other than the named 
beneficiary. 
In some households, several persons may be receiving So-
cial Security benefits paid through a representative payee. 
State benefit programs have frequently written their eligibility 
rules in a manner which cumulates this income as a single 
household income. As a consequencef a single applicant for 
benefits may have those benefits denied through attribution of 
this household income. 
These eligibility rules regarding cumulation of repre-
sentative payee benefits have been struck down in the past. In 
Snider v. Creasy (1984 6th Cir.) 728 F.2d 369, the Court of Ap-
peals held that such deeming violated federal regulation in a 
determination of eligibility for AFDC benefits. The Court noted 
The federal regulations governing the ad-
ministration of benefits through a repre-
sentative payee specifically require the 
payee to use "the benefits of the beneficiary 
in a manner and for the purpose, he or she 
determines...to be in the beneficiary's best 
interest." [citation] The representative payee's 
discretionary role in spending on the bene-
ficiary's behalf is abrogated by [the State's] 
policy. The practical effect of this policy 
is to directly allocate these funds to one 
other than the intended beneficiary, thereby 
eliminating the representative payee's discre-
19 
tion to determine how benefits should be 
spent on the beneficiary's behalf. Such an 
abrogation is impermissable. Moreover, the 
duties and obligations imposed upon the 
representative payee, are federally mandated 
and failure to fulfill these obligations can 
expose the representative payee to criminal 
liability. (Emphasis supplied) 
M.r at p. 372; accord, Riddick v. D'Elia (1980 2d Cir.) 626 F.2c 
1084. These decisions deny states any authority to cumulate 
benefits paid through a representative payee. 
After these decisions were issued. Congress enacted th< 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, §2640. As the Direc-
tor of the Department of Health pointed out in her Final Deter-
mination, DEFRA (codified as 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(38)) declares tha 
for purposes of AFDC eligibility 
A State plan for aid and services to 
needy families with children must-
(38) provide that in making the determi-
nation under paragraph (7) with respect 
to a dependent child and applying para-
graph (8) , the State agency shall (except 
as otherwise provided in this part) in-
clude-
(B) any brother or sister of such child, 
if such brother or sister meets the con-
ditions described in clauses (1) and (2) 
of section 606(a) of this title, is such 
parent, brother, or sister is living in 
the same house as the dependent child, 
and any income of, or available for such 
parent, brother, or sister shall be in-
cluded in making such determination and 
applying such paragraph with respect to 
the family (notwithstanding section 405 (i) 
of this title, in the case of benefits 
provided under subchapter II of this 
chapter) [Emphasis supplied]. 
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The apparent significance of the parenthetical reference 
to §405 (j) is the removal of any bar to the deeming of repre-
sentative payee income in AFDC cases. However, the courts are in 
conflict on this point, for some have found that DEFRA does 
remove the deeming barf while others agree that it still exists 
and is enforceable. Ardister v. Mansour (W.D. Mich. 1986) 627 
F.Supp. 641, [Title II (Old Age Survivor and Disability 
Insurance) payments made to the representative payee of a child 
beneficiary must be deemed available for common use to AFDC ap-
plicants under DEFRA]; Collins v. Barry (N.D. Ohio 1986) 644 
F.Supp. 249, 253 ["...OASDI benefits paid to a representative 
payee in trust for a minor beneficiary cannot be deemed as income 
available to the family generally but are restricted to use for 
the sole benefit of the minor beneficiary."]; Whitehorse v. Heck-
lex (D.S.D. 1985) 627 F.Supp. 848f 855 ["...the ambiguous 
reference in §2640(a) to §205(j) [sic] ... is not sufficient to 
repeal the prohibitions which clearly outlaw the use of 
0.A.S.D.I. benefits by anyone other than the named 
beneficiaries...."]. 
Whatever the outcome of this conflict between the 
courts, one message is clear in their differing opinions: DEFRA 
amends only AFDC eligibility rules, and to the extent the repre-
sentative payee bar is removed at all, it is only removed in 
regard to AFDC eligibility determinations. This is clear from 
the terminology of §2640 itself, which refers only to AFDC 
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eligibility under Title IV. DEFRA amends no rules regarding 
Medicaid eligibility under Title XIX. 
Because DEFRA does not amend Title XIXf the bar againsl 
deeming Social Security Survivorfs benefitsf paid through a rep-
resentative payee, as being available to an applicant fo 
Medicaid remains intact and unchanged. It is therefore a viola 
tion of federal law and regulation to attribute such income ai 
available to a Medicaid applicant. 
Jerry Grandson's nieces and sister received Survivor1 
benefits through Nellie Grandson as a representative payee 
Federal law barred that income from being deemed as available t 
meet any financial obligation of Jerry Grandson. Yet the Fina 
Determination of the Director of the Department of Health le 
stand a Medicaid eligibility assessment which in fact deemed tha 
representative payee income as being available to Jerry. As 
consequence, the Final Determination ignored federal law. Be 
cause the Director is obligated by Utah law to obey federa 
statutes and regulations in the administration of the medical as 
sistance program, her Final Determination is arbitrary and capri 
cious, and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Jerry Grandson applied for Medicaid benefits in 198! 
In determining his eligibility, Social Security Survivor 
benefits received through a representative payee to his sister 
22 
and two nieces were deemed to be income available to him. This 
eligibility decision was upheld by the Director of the Department 
of Health in her Final Determination. 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D) denies state agencies any 
authority to attribute income from a sibling as being available 
to a Medicaid applicant under Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act. This statute, and its related federal and state regula-
tions, were not amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
which only allows the counting of sibling income in the deter-
mination of eligibility for benefits under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act (Aid to Families With Dependent Children). In 
Medicaid cases, state agencies may only count the income of an 
applicant's parent or spouse as being available to the applicant. 
42 U.S.C. §405(j) and §408(e) provide that benefits 
received by a representative payee may only be used for the ac-
tual beneficiary. While the federal courts are in disagreement 
over the issue of whether DEFRA removed this bar in the deter-
mination of eligibility for AFDC, they appear to agree that no 
such amendment has taken place in regard to Medicaid. It would 
therefore violate these statutes, and their related regulations, 
to deem benefits received through a representative payee as being 
available to a Medicaid applicant. 
The Final Determination of the Director of the Depart-
ment of Health is invalid on two independent grounds. First, it 
counts the income of Jerry's siblings as being available to him, 
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although such deeming is barred by §1396a(a)(17)(D). Second, i 
counts income paid through a representative payee as being avail 
able to Jerry, although that deeming is barred by §405 (j) an 
§408(e). 
To reach the result of her Final Determination, tY 
Director had to deliberately side-step fixed and unambiguoi 
federal and state law. Such a manuever is arbitrary and caprj 
cious. The Final Determination must therefore be reversed. 
Date: XtfOy /<?%/ 
Steven Boos 
DMA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Petitioner 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY GRANDSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SUZANNE DANDOY, in her capacity 
as Executive Director of the } 
Utah Department of Health, ] 
Respondent. 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 4902 
The petitioner has filed a petition with the Court 
seeking a judicial review of the final determination of the 
respondent wherein the petitioner contends that the respondent 
acted capriciously in adopting the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law recommended by the Hearing Officer in this 
case. It is the contention of the petitioner that the Hearing 
Officer and the Director capriciously misapplied the law and 
applicable regulations when they determined that the 
petitioner, who is a child applicant, was not eligible for 
medical assistance payments. The sole legal issue is whether 
the Director is correct when she included the income available 
to all household members of petitioner's family in calculating 
the amount of income available to the petitioner as it applies 
to his eligibility for medical assistance payments. 
The Court has reviewed the memorandums submitted by 
the petitioner and the respondent and the applicable laws and 
regulations and has concluded that the laws and regulations 
relative to the payment of medical assistance must be read and 
construed in their totality, and that no particular law or 
regulation should be isolated and treated as the final word. 
The Court has further concluded that the director's conclusion 
is not contrary to those laws and regulations, and that the 
Director was not acting capriciously in her actions in this 
case. 
Therefore, the Court denies the petitioner's 
application for alteration of the final order of the respondent 
The Attorney for the respondent is directed to 
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this f^~ J ^ day of February, 1987. 
y 
< ? * 7-/ 
BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
STUART W. HINCKLEY (4051) 
Division Chief 
BRIAN L. FARR (1037) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-7642 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY GRANDSON : 
Petitioner, : 
-v- : 
SUZANNE DANDOYf in her capacity : 
as Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Health, : 
Respondent. : 
ORDER 
Civil No. 4902 
This matter came before the Court on appeal from an 
administrative hearing in the Department of Health pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 26-23-2. Having reviewed the record, the 
memoranda submitted by counsel and the applicable laws and 
regulations, the Court has concluded that the laws and 
regulations relative to the payment of medical assistance must be 
read and construed in their totality, and that no particular law 
or regulation should be isolated and treated as the final word. 
The Court has further concluded that the Director1s Final 
Determination is not contrary to those laws and regulations, and 
that the Director was not acting capriciously in her actions in 
this case. 
NOW THEREFORE it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Respondent 
affirming the Final Determination of the Executive Director of 
the Department of Health; and 
2. The relief requested by Petitioner is denied. 
DATED this 2£l_ day of J^/^V//i// , 198/. 
/ HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL 
/ District/<5ourt Juclge 
S/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Judgment, postage prepaidf to the following: 
Steven Boos, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DNA - People's Legal Services, Inc. 
P.O. Box 488 
Mexican Hatf Utah 84531 
Brian L. Farrf Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84114 
on t h i s the 30Zl day of /AxV^ , 1987. 
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F I N A L D E T E R M I N A T I O N 
Having reviewed the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Fair 
Hearing Officer of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Department of Social 
Services, incorporated herein, and having found that they are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
That the aforementioned recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law be 
sustained, and that the Hearing Officer's recommended decision be affirmed. 
In doing so, the Department of Health (the "Department" or "DOH") is not 
unmindful of the position advanced by claimant. 
In this regards, the Department has, as above, reviewed and scrutinized the 
whole record and also reviewed relevant: 1. state and federal legislation; 
2. CFR citations; 3. legislative histories and agency directives, including 
federal Health and Human Services ("HHS") advisories regarding relevant 
regulatory measures passed thereunder; and 4. pertinent court decisions, both 
state and federal, regarding the present issue(s) before the Department. 
DOH, under authority of Section 26-18-3 UCA and as implemented by contract 
with the Utah Department of Social Services ("DSS") through DSS's Office of 
Community Operations' ("0C0") District Office ("district") network, has 
designated DSS as the eligibility determinating agency for the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program, Section 26-18-1, et. seq. UCA, commonly called Medicaid. 
In determining eligibility for Medicaid, the district office utilizes the 
procedures and standards established by DSS which are condensed in written 
form in Volume III, "Medical Assistance," of DSS's Assistance Payments 
Administration (APA) determination guidelines. Such procedures and standards 
being a compilation of relevant state and federal law and directives 
thereunder. 
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
3180 STATE OFFICE BUILDING • PO BOX 45500 . SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84145-0500 • (801)533-6111 
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER 
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While on a day-to-day basis, in large measure the district office refers to 
this manual for daily guidance and direction, it, the district, must and is 
guided also by aV[ pertinent state and federal law, both statutory/regulatory 
and case law. 
From a review by the Department of such relevant materials it can as a 
starting point be stated that the key issues and determinative factors as 
regards claimant's el1g1bility/1ne1ig1bility center on: 
1. Defining the "assistance unit" or, more precisely, the "filing unit" 
and, 
2. Applying such definition(s) to the present factual situation as to 
determining appropriate family contribution or "deeming" as to 
determining the eligibility of claimant. 
At first glance and upon cursory review of claimant's position, it would 
appear that only claimant's monthly income of $158.00 and not that of his 
siblings can be included in claimant's eligibility determination. (Ihis 
excluding for the moment any "deeming" of claimant's mother's income which 
apparently was initially ignored by the district office). For by reference to 
certain CFR citations, namely 20 CFR 404.2035 which in part states: 
"A representative payee has a responsibility to -
(a) Use the payments he or she receives only for the use and benefit 
of the beneficiary in a manner and for the purposes he or she 
determines, under the guidelines in this subpart, to be 1n the 
best interests of the beneficiary;" 
and from 42 CFR 435.602 we read in part: 
(a) Except for a spouse of an individual or a parent for a child who 
is under age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must not -
(1) Consider income and resources of any relative available to an 
individual; nor . . . " 
Also reference to the case law in this area would on first glance appear to 
further bolster claimant's contention. Johnson v. Harder, C.A. Conn. 1925., 
512 F. 2d 1188, certiorari denied 96 S. Ct. 149. Snider v. Creasy, C.A. Ohio 
Q ? 8 4 ) 728 F. 2d 369. Chaddick v. Adult and Family Services Division, 1981, 
632 p. 2d 33, 53 Or. App. 508. 
If our inquiry stopped at this point, claimant's position would seemingly be 
dispositive. 
What must be viewed is the underlying intent of the legislation setting up the 
determination process and the status of the whole law at the time claimant 
walked into the district office. 
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From 20 CFR 404.1 we read: 
The regulations in this Part 404 (Regulations No. 4 of the Social Security 
Administration) relate to the provisions of Title II of the Social 
Security Act as amended on August 28, 1950 [42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.], 
and as further amended thereafter. 
By reference to 42 U.S.C. 405 (j) we find the foundation authorization for 20 
CFR 404.2035 regarding representative payees wherein we read 1n part: 
42 USC 405 (j) 
(l)When it appears to the Secretary that the interest of an applicant 
entitled to a payment would be served thereby, certification of payment 
may be made, regardless of the legal competency of the individual entitled 
thereto, either for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use and 
benefit to a relative or some other person. 
From 42 USC 602 (a) (38) we read: 
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must-
(38) provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with 
respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency 
shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include -
(A) any parent of such child, and 
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister 
meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 
606(a) of this title, if such parent, brother, or sister is living in 
the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available 
for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such 
determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family 
(notwithstanding section 405 (j) of this title, in the rase of 
benefits provided under subchapter III of this chapter); and . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
[Paragraphs (7) and (8) dealing with the $1,000 family ceiling and 
$75/$l60 earned income disregards; clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) 
defining "dependent child."] 
Clauses (A) and (B) of 602 (a)(38) stating that "in making the 
determination . • • the State agency shall . . . include -
(A) any parent of such child, and 
(B) any brother or sister of such child . . . (Emphasis added) 
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Such parents and siblings being viewed as part of the "filing unit." (See 
HHS Transmittal No. SSA-AT-86-1 , dated January 13, 1986, a copy of which 
is attached). 
Further from clause (B) we read: 
" . . .and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister 
shall be included in making such determination . . . (notwithstanding 
section 405 (.i) of this title . . . " (Emphasis added) (Note: And by 
implication "notwithstanding 20 CFR 404.2035") 
The above referenced section 42 USC 602 (a) (38) being an amendment and 
addition as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and effective as of July 
18. 1984 Pub. L. 98-369, Title VI, Section 2640. 
Such being a specific statutory response and legislative overriding of case 
law as embodied in Johnson v. Harder and Snider v. Creasy; with such 
legislation for all practical purposes doing away with representative payee 
"limitations" (at least as regards AF0C related determinations). (See also in 
this regards 45 CFR 206.10 (a)(l)(v11)). 
Even prior to the Congress1 declaration, the courts1 have (had) been 
undermining the representative payee "for the use and benefit of the 
beneficiary" position. See Summers v. DfElia I9i)3, 465 NYS 2d, 95 A.0. 2d 
184. Korbel v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. PA Commw. Ct. No. 976 C D . 19/8 
(December 12f 1979). "-"** 
In applying the whole law to claimant when he presented himself via his 
motherfs application on his behalf on April 22, 1985 it is clearly evident 
that the filing unit included: a) claimant; b) claimant's mother (even 
before the July 18, 1984 section 42 USC 602 amendments); and c) claimant's 
siblings; and all of their available income as a family unit no matter in what 
form received - whether directly or indirectly via a representative payee or 
otherwise. 
Analysis as regards sections 325 and 327 of Volume III of the APA further 
bolsters the district office's determination when read in light of the above 
congressional and regulatory enactments rather than negating it as claimant 
would assert* 
It follows presumptively assuming that the district office's $ figures are 
correct that with or without the claimant's mother's income being included 
that the district's denial was appropriate and correct based on inclusion of 
the siblings' income. 
Accordingly, as above, the Hearing Officer's recommended decision is hereby 
affirmed. 
It is further ordered that a copy of this final determination be sent to the 
claimant at his last known address by certified mail, return receipt 
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requested; to his attorney of record by certified mail, return receipt 
requested; and to the appropriate District Office and/or other state agency 
for action in accordance herewith. 
An appeal from this final determination may be secured pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 26-23-2 (1953 & Supp. 1983) by filing a petition in the 
appropriate District Court of the State of Utah within 30 days after this 
final determination is received. Failure to file such a petition within the 
30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of all right to appeal this 
determination. 
DATED this !H day of Vfl<l ^ ^ 1986, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
/Oe^>^ t c r 
Suzanne/^lndoy, M.D., M.P.H, 
Executive Director 
y& 
\ r y 
0^
 m a —^ a Norman H Banaerter, Governor, StaH of Utah 
SOCI3l wGrVICGS NormanQ Angus, Executive Director 
F A I R H E A R I N G I N T H E 
I N T E R E S T O F ) 
) 
Jerry Grandson 11/85 #9 ) 
R E C O M M E N D E D D E C I S I O N 
The above entitled matter having been regularly heard before the Fair 
Hearing Officer of the Office of Administrative Hearings, of the Department 
of Social Services, and proper notice having been given the claimant, and 
all of the facts, circumstances, and rights of the claimant having been duly 
considered: 
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED: That the decision by the District VII 
(B) Office of Community Operations that all household members and income 
must be considered 1n determining excess income is hereby sustained. Refer 
to Volume III, §§325 and 327, 
Dated this < £ p ^ day of December 19 85 . 
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
^ 7 A ^ ^ 
NeaK Bernson 
Fair Hearing Officer 
Office Of Administrative Hearings 150 Wast North Tempi*. Fourth Floor 
Bill L.Walker, Director P ° Box 45500. Salt Lake City .UIth84HS 0500 
801-533-73oo & D3o~tJ5oO 
An Equal Opportunity Employer 
FAIR HEARING SUMMARY 10/85 #9 
Medical Assistance 
District VII (B) OCQ-APA 
Hearing Held through Correspondence 
Neal Bernson, Hearing Examiner 
I. ISSUE: 
The claimant requested a hearing on August 28, 1985, to appeal a decision 
by the District VII (B) Office of Community Operations in requiring 
excess income to be paid to qualify for Medical Assistance. On September 
5, 1985 the claimant's representative and the district office were noti-
fied that the hearing would be conducted through correspondence. On 
September 17, 1985 the district office summarized their position in a 
brief* A copy was provided to the Office of Administrative Hearings and 
the claimant's representative. The claimant's representative made a 
response on September 24, 1985. Upon review of the claimant's represen-
tative's brief, the district office made a response on October 1, 1985. 
A final response was then made by the claimant's representative on 
October 3, 1985, which was received by the Office of Administrative 
Hearings on October 7, 1985. 
District Office's Summary: 
On September 17, 1985, the district office representative stated, through 
correspondence, that on April 22, 1985 the claimant's mother applied for 
Medical Assistance in behalf of her son. The claimant's mother was asked 
to verify the monthly household income. She failed to provice verifica-
tion of her household Income; and, therefore, her application was denied. 
On June 19, 1985 the family reapplied for Medical Assistance. She veri-
fied that their monthly income from Social Security was $1,432.00. There 
are six people 1n the household, so their monthly excess income was 
determined to be $766.00. On July 25, 1985, the district office sent 
the claimant a Notice of Decision, and a Form 417-A that explained how 
much the family would have to pay for the Medical ID Card. On July 31, 
1985 the family had not made any contact with the district office, so 
their second application for Medical Assistance was also denied. The 
denial action is based on Volume III, §325.1 which states that all chil-
dren must be included in the assistance unit, and §327.3 and 327.32 which 
requires one to deem all income of the family because the only programs 
for which the claimant could qualify is either F or C category. Based 
on these regulations, the district office counted the total Income of the 
family to determine an MAO excess income payment. 
Claimant's Representative's Response: 
The claimant's representative stated that the district office's represen-
tative, while not citing any authority, states that the only ground for 
denying the Medical Assistance 1s excess income arrived at by totaling 
the claimant's family's Social Security income. The claimant accordingly 
limits his response to the Issue of the income calculation. 
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I. ISSUE: 
Claimant's Representative's Response: (continued) 
In two letters to a district office worker, dated August 29, and August 
30, 1985, the claimant's representative outlined the claimant's arguments 
against the Income calculation made 1n his case. The claimant would like 
these letters to serve as his main brief 1n this appeal. 
To briefly recapitulate the arguments of those letters, 1t should first 
be noted that under 42 U.S.C., §1396a, a state Medical Assistance program 
must comply with certain federal guidelines. A state program also cannot 
require applicants to violate federal law. The Code of Federal Regula-
tions, at Title 42, §435, sets out eligibility rules to be followed by 
state assistance programs. Section 435.602 (quoted 1n the August 30, 
1985 letter) makes 1t Improper for a state program to use an eligibility 
calculation which considers the Income of child applicant's relative, 
except a parent, to be available to the child. As a result, when deter-
mining the eligible Income of a child, the state formula may only total 
the income of the child and Its parents, and may not add 1n the income 
of any other relative. 
As a separate matter, 20 C.F.R., §404.2035, makes it unlawful for Social 
Security payments, made to a representative payee, to be used for any 
person other than the beneficiary. Thus, a state Medical Assistance 
program which requires a representative payee to total family beneficiary 
payments by holding that the aggregate amount is available to any single 
member of the family would violate federal law. 
Here, the district office's MAO-Excess Income Computation has calculated-
a group Income by totaling the Social Security payments made to the 
claimant and his brothers and sisters. These payments are made to the 
claimant's mother as a representative payee. By totaling these sums, the 
district office assumes that the income of his siblings is available to 
meet the obligations of the claimant. Such a calculation violates the 
dictates of 20 C.F.R., §404.2035 and 42 C.F.R., §435.602. 
The proper calculation would be to determine the claimant's eligibility 
based upon his Income and that of his parents, excluding income from his 
siblings. Such a calculation would put him well within the Assistance 
Payments Administration's Table II, Basic Maintenance Standard. 
Such a result does not seem to be inconsistent with Utah regulations. 
As noted in the letter of August 29, 1985, Volume III, §325, of the 
Assistance Payments Administration's Manual states quite clearly that, 
"[t]he decision of who to cover under a Medical Assistance grant 1s dif-
ferent than the decision of whose income to count." Simply because 
coverage of all the claimant's siblings may be required dies not mean 
that the district office may use an income calculation which assumes 
their income 1s available to him. And, in line with the federal regula-
tions, §327.32 just as clearly states that a child's eligibility is cal-
culated by counting only the Income of the child and its parents. 
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ISSUE: 
Claimant's Representative's Response: 
(continued) 
As a matter of federal and Utah law, the medical excess of $766.00 for 
the claimant 1s erroneous. Under a legally valid calculation there 1s 
no excess, and the district office's denial of assistance is improper. 
On October 3, 1985 the claimant's representative responded to the dis-
trict office representative's Memorandum of October 1, 1985, regarding 
the claimant's appeal. The district office representative cited Volume 
III, §327.32, as authority for the denial of the claimant's application 
for Medical Assistance, stating that this section, "...requires one to 
deem all Income of the family...." Therefore, the total income of the 
family was counted to determine an MAO excess payment. However, §327.32 
clearly states that when an unemandpated child lives with his parents, 
as does the claimant, the income of only the parents and the child is to 
be counted. The inclusion of the income of the claimant's siblings in 
the calculation to determine the claimant's eligibility was not in accor 
dance with the regulations. Therefore, §327.32, when applied correctly, 
qualifies the claimant for Medical Assistance under the APA, Table II, 
Basic Maintenance Standard. 
The claimant's representative noted that the district office representa-
tive's suggestion that the claimant's mother's Social Security income, 
not figured into the original MAO excess income calculation would add to 
the total excess payment. However, this suggestion, unsubstantiated by 
any evidentiary submission, 1s not properly a part of this appeal, as th 
e claimant's mother's income was not used as grounds for the original 
denial in this case. Therefore, the district office representative's 
statement concerning the claimant's mother's Social Security income can-
not be considered in reaching a decision in this appeal. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The claimant's mother applied for Medical Assistance for her one son. 
In the home is one other child and two grandchildren the claimant's 
mother has legally adopted. The application was for MNC Medical Assis-
tance to cover some medical expenses for the claimant. The household's 
income 1s Social Security benefits computed by the district office as 
follows: 
Child No. 1. (Grandchild) $ 558.00 
Child No. 2. (Grandchild) 558.00 
Child No. 3. (Mother's Child) 158.00 
Child No. 4. (Mother's Child) 158.00 
Total Household Income $1,432.00 
-4-
II. FINDINGS OF FACT: (continued) 
The district office considered the above Income of $1,432.00. From this 
was deducted the Basic Maintenance Standard of $666.00, leaving the 
claimant with $766.00 1n excess Income. The district office has now 
stated that the claimant's mother's Social Security benefits will also 
have to be considered 1n the calculation, significantly Increasing the 
excess Income to be paid by the claimant. The claimant's representative 
contends that the district office has Improperly applied the intent of 
the existing Volume III and federal regulations to the claimant's cir-
cumstances. The Volume III procedures that he feels have been applied 
Incorrectly to the claimant's case, are Volume III, §§325 and 327.3. 
These procedures state as follows: 
Volume III, §325 
"Deciding Who to Cover - Non-Nurs1nq Home Cases 
The decision of who to cover is different than the decision 
of whose income to count. For policy on whose Income to 
count, see Section 327 (Deemed Income). 
If a client can qualify under both coverage groups (A, B 
and D), or (F and C), he may choose the group he wants. 
325.1 Who Must be Covered - F and C Cases 
The decision of who to cover depends on two factors: 
1. The relationship of certain relatives to the 
person who wants coverage. 
When a child applies for coverage, with few 
exceptions, all of his parents, stepparents, 
brothers, sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, 
adopted brothers, and adopted sisters whom he 
lives with must be included in the case. 
When a parent applies for coverage, with few 
exceptions his spouse and children whom he lives 
with must be Included in the case. 
and 2. The eligibility of these relatives for the same 
category as the person who wants coverage. 
For instance, a parent might qualify for F or C 
category, depending on his age. A child may 
qualify for either category based upon the eli-
gibility of his parents for the F case. 
-5-
II. FINDINGS OF FACT: (continued) 
Do not include someone who is not eligible, such 
as someone over age 18, on a C case. 
If parents and dependent children qualify for F 
and C cases at the same time, open only the F 
case. 
Volume III9 §327.3 
Whose Income to Count 
327.31 For an Emancipated Child 
When a child 1s emancipated, count only his income. 
327.32 For an Unemandpated Child 
1. Count the Income of the parents and the child 
when the child lives with his parents. This 
includes children in non-AFDC foster care that 
have been placed in their own homes (See Sec. 
213.5). 
For B, and D cases, a child is considered liv-
ing with his parents until the month after he 
moves. 
For F and C cases, a child is considered liv-
ing with his parents while temporarily absent 
from the home, such as for school, vacation, 
summer employment, medical treatment, etc. 
2. Count only the income of the child, including 
support payments made by the parents, in these 
situations: 
F and C Cases - when the child 1s living away 
from his parents and it is not temporary. 
a. This includes a child in Foster Care that 
has not been placed back in his own home 
(see Sec. 213.5). 
b. This Includes a child in AFDC foster care, 
no matter where he lives. 
-6-
II. FINDINGS OF FACT: (continued) 
c. This Includes a child living with a speci-
fied relative, and 1t 1s not temporary. 
B and D Cases - when the child lives separate 
from his parents - for any reason. A child 1s 
considered living with his parents until the 
month after he moves.11 
In considering the above procedures, the claimant's representative con-
tends that the Social Security checks are made out for the children, and 
each payment 1s reserved to the beneficiary and cannot be applied to the 
obligations of any other person. By totaling all benefits, assumes that 
the Social Security payment made to the claimant's mother for her adopted 
grandchildren is available to her children for use and benefit. Conse-
quently, the calculation would be illegal under federal law. The claim-
ant's representative feels that a proper calculation would have been to 
consider only the claimant with total unearned income of $158.00 avail-
able to him. Each other child receiving Social Security benefits would 
then have their own Social Security for themselves. Therefore, under the 
proper intent of Volume III, §§325 and 327, the regulations allow the 
district office to consider the total household number of five, but only 
consider the income available to the one son needing Medical Assistance 
which would be well under the $666.00 Basic Maintenance Standard. Con-
sequently, calculation made 1n harm of federal law on Social Security 
payments leaves no MAO excess, and benefits cannot be denied. The claim-
ant's representative also contends that 42 C.F.R., §435.602, discusses 
financial eligibility requirements for state Medicaid plans, and states 
as follows: 
M(a) Except for a spouse of an individual or a parent for 
a child who is under age 21 or blind or disabled, 
the agency must not-
(1) Consider Income and resources of any relative avail-
able to an Individual; nor 
(2) Collect reimbursement from any relative for amounts 
paid by the agency for services provided to an indi-
vidual. " 
The claimant's representative feels that the above procedures taken out 
of the federal regulations support his conclusions that you cannot con-
sider all household and all income in determining the amount of excess 
income to be collected for and in behalf of the claimant with a medical 
need. 
The Hearing Examiner finds that the decision by the District VII (B) 
Office of Community Operations 1s correct in their calculations of excess 
income based on the income of the four children. The claimant's mother's 
Social Security Income, however, is also countable income. This should 
-7-
FINDINGS OF FACT: (continued) 
be verified, and the correct amount of excess income determined. The 
district office has correctly Interpreted the intent of Volume III, §§325 
and 327. Under the claimant's mother's household circumstances wherein 
she has two children and two legally adopted grandchildren, all minor 
children and their income would have to be counted in the determination 
of Medicaid excess income for any child seeking Medical Assistance. The 
claimant's representative also raises several questions relative to the 
application of the federal regulations. The Hearing Examiner will not 
respond to the legal arguments as stated by the claimant's representa-
tive. However, they are being made part of the record; and, therefore, 
can be reviewed by legal counsel of the Department of Health. All cor-
respondence between the claimant's representative and the district office 
will be forwarded to the Department of Health for review. 
RECOMMENDED DECISION: 
The Hearing Examiner recommends that the decision by the District VII (B) 
Office of Community Operations that all household members and income must 
be considered in determining excess income is hereby sustained. Refer 
to Volume III, §§325 and 327. 
FINAL DETERMINATION: 
The Department of Health sustained the Hearing Examiner's recommended 
decision. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This 1s to certify that I have mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Hearing Decision and Order to Jerry Grandson, the Claimant; Steven 
Boos, the Claimant's Representative; Nancy Stone, Good Samaritan Medical 
Center; and Steve Wilcox, District Office Director, 
Dated QfiA2L<J%/9$& (5¥***> K^dlAs^L 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
Civil Action No. 85-Z-1459 
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Judge, United States District Court for the District of 
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Assistant U.S. Attorney, 1961 Stout Street, Suite 1200, Denver, 
Colorado, 80294, appearing for the Federal defendant. 
V1VIANN.E CHAUMONT OATES, Office of the Attorney General, 
State of Colorado, 1525 Sherman Street, Third Floor, Denver, 
Colorado, 80203, appearing for the Colorado defendant. 
(The arguments of Counsel are not herein transcribed, 
pursuant to the direction of ordering counsel. The following 
proceedings then were had and entered of record:) 
RULING 
THE COURTt The question that's before the Court today 
is an important one. It involves a statute passed by Congress 
as a deficit reducing measure which restricts the scope of AFDC 
payments or appears to, by in large, affect scope of financial 
resources considered in determining whether a family is 
eligible for AFDC Payments. 
The Court notes that an agency's interpretation of a 
statute that it administers is entitled to some deference by 
the Court; and the interpretation of a statute which is 
reflected in agency regulations needs to be reasonable and 
consistent with the underlying statute. And the agency's 
interpretation does not have to be the only reasonable 
interpretation; it has to be a reasonable interpretation 
consistent with the statute. This are cites on thatt the Udall 
case, 380 U.S. 1, 1964, case and others. 
I want to thank the attorneys for the excellent job of 
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briefing that was done and lot the really extraordinary extra-
good arguments that were made this morning. In view of the 
briefing and in view of the arguments, which I must say sort of 
firmed up my thoughts after reading the briefs, the Court will 
decide this matter in the following way? And let me say to 
both sides that 1 do not intend to issue a written opinion. I 
think there is lots' of written opinions, some of which has been 
very thorough in their analysis. Out what I say now will be on 
the record; and if this is going to be appealed in this circuit, 
you can ask the reporter for a transcript. So let me 
incorporate by reference verbally my findings and my 
conclusions. 
It would appear that the--from the legislative history, 
from the language of the—of DEFRA, the Deficit Reduction Act,-
602--let's see—402 United States 602(a) (38), that the intent 
of Congress is clear that the income of dependent children 
should be included in the family unit which files for AFDC 
benefits. There is no requirement that I see that the children 
included in the filing unit be, quote/unquote, "needy." 
Section 602(a)(38) incorporates clauses 1 and 2 of 606(a). 
That's pretty technical, perhaps, that "needy" does not lie 
within those clauses. 
But in any case, if I were to adopt plaintiffs' 
interpretation of this statute, basically we would make 
602(a) (38) ineffective. It would apply in so few cases, it 
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4 
would apply only to the "grandmother giving somebody an 
unrestrictive support" type of case. It would not apply in 
Title II cases for the most part, nor in child support cases, 
for the most part} and those two considerations were 
specifically intended by Congress to apply, from reading this 
act. Subsection 38 does talk about Title 11. Subsection 39 
talks about child support. 
I don't intend to read 602(a)(38) out of existence. 
This court does not make law; this court looks at the law as 
made by Congress and tries to interpret it reasonably; and in 
interpreting it reasonably, this does include the income of 
these dependent children in the family who receive Title VII 
(sic) child support and other payments in the family unit. 
From a policy viewpoint, one understands why this was 
done. It makes sense from a policy point of view to look at 
the whole real family unit to see what that unit's income is, 
whether it's a half sibling or a whole sibling or whether one 
child is getting Social Security and another isn't. It makes 
sense because one uses Social Security payments, where you do 
have a family which is needy or dependent, in paying rent and 
food. 
Mow* it would appear to me that there really is no 
need, for the agency to have individualized hearings to conclude 
on a case-by-case basis whether there is financial need or 
whether this child's benefits are available for the other 
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members of the family. In the great majority of the cases — and 
it would appear to me all the cases represented by the 
plaintiffs here—the children do qualify for inclusion into the 
filing unit by being deprived of the care of one parent; and 
there doesn't have to be this case-by-case basis. 
I recognize that there may be some isolated cases. I 
tried to think of some. It was very hard for me to come up 
with some, where because of a child's deformity they need 
special clothes or perhaps because of their size, or maybe 
because there is a musical genius who needs special musical 
lessons. And those cases can be handled, it would appear to me, 
by an after-the-fact hearing rather than a before-the-fact 
hearing. I don't see that there is any due process requirement 
that there be a hearing before determining these benefits, 
where the statute is very clear in its intent and in its policy. 
The question is raised in the briefs primarily, 
although it's been touched on—whether in passing 602(a) (38), 
Congress intended to repeal by implication the criminal 
provisions of 408(e), which prohibit a custodial payee from 
spending Title II benefits on anyone other than the child 
qualifying for them. 
It appears to me to some extent to be really a highly 
technical argument, because in most cases where you apply the 
benefits for the child receiving the Title II benefits for rent, 
for food, the others are receiving incidentally the benefits of 
those payments. But even where one might — if the amount 
received is large and one might spend it on specific things for 
other childrenf such as clothes or baby foodf for example, 
which wouldn*t apply to the child receiving the Title II 
benefit, it would seem to me that clearly by enacting DLFKA, 
Congress did impliedly indicate that the criminal sanctions 
would not apply in the cases where DEFRA does apply. And 1 
think that has to be implied; so whether you want to call it an 
implied repeal of the application of the criminal penalties if 
the suspending is because of the family following the mandates 
of DEFRA, the fact of including those children in the family 
unit, or whether you want to just say that the criminal 
sanctions would not applyf I donft know how that you want to 
hypothetically—what you want to call it, it seems clear to me 
that there could not be these criminal penalties if, in fact, 
the provisions# the requirements of 602(a) (38), are being 
followed. 
So the court agrees, then, with the holding or the 
reasoning in Huber v« Bllnilnqer, which is the case from the 
Northern District of Indiana, a 1985 case, in holding that 
Congress did not intend the criminal sanctions to apply in this 
type of situation dealing with Title II benefits. 
As to child support payments, I conclude that Congress 
explicitly included child support payments within the financial 
resources to be included by the AFDC filing unit. The first 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
$50 Is exempt. Child support over $50 is included within the 
unit; and I think that is clear from the Congressional mandate, 
from the statute and the regulations. The fact that the child 
support payments are included within the AFDC Filing does not 
constitute any unconstitutional taking of property. 
1 would conclude that the statute and the regulations 
permissibly require families receiving AFDC Payments to include 
such support payments in the resources of the unit; and this 
condition of receiving benefits does not violate any 
constitutional provisions, the 5th or 14th Amendments' property 
clauses, or the contract clause of the Constitution. 
As to Medicaid eligibilty, the issue of Hedicade 
eligibility is whether consideration of a sibling's income is 
within the meaning of the phrase "financial responsibility of 
any individual for any applicant or recipient," which is found 
at 42 United States Code 1396 (a) (17) (d). Now, that section 
does not talk about siblings. It talks about spouse and parent; 
and I'm not persuaded by the Secretary's argument concerning 
the legislative history. I agree with the plaintiff that the 
history is weak and although Congress may have intended to 
reF*;«.ict financial burdens on children caring for older parents, 
they were very specific in their language. They talked about 
spouse and parent. Nothing is said about siblings; and as far 
as Medicaid is concerned, nothing in the statutory or the 
regulations deem a sibling's come to be such as to reduce 
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Medicaid payments. 
! think when we look at this in a public policy point 
of view, also, the example that was given or that was 
considered when I was discussing this with the attorneys for 
the defendant—defendants—make it clears A family's AFDC 
income may actually be reduced by the effect of DEFRA; and it 
doesn't make any sense at all to—while you're reducing it to 
also cut out the Medicaid payments when there is nothing that 
says they must be cut out. So on this issue, I go along with 
the case law and agree with the courts which have uniformly 
upheld the plaintiffs' position on Medicaid. 
Let me just touch on constitutional arguments that 
have been made. There are constitutional challenges to this 
statute; and the Court concludes that these are without merit. 
We have many laws which indirectly affect privacy and family 
sanctity but are not for that reason unconstitutional. 
As far as due process and equal protection, statutes 
and regulations are looked at under rational review standards; 
and the Court finds that the statute and regulations that we've 
been looking at this morning are rationally related to a 
permissible goal of determining eligibility for Federal 
benefits and of course trying to reduce payments under the 
Deficit Reduction Act. 
As to the 10th Amendment, I find no violation of the 
10th Amendment from any of this in looking at the recent Garcia 
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v, San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority case, 105 Supreme 
Court 1005, which is a 1985 case? and I don't see that there is 
any problem. 
So in conclusion, the Court will at this time grant in 
part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment and grant in part and deny in part the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, as I've indicated, in that the 
interpretation of the rule, which requires the income of 
siblings or half-siblings under Title VII, child support or 
other income to be considered as set forth in 42 United States 
Cosde 602(a)(38), is a proper interpretation. The statute is 
proper, the regulations are proper, and that statute is to be 
followed and upheld* 
However, the Court further is convinced that Medicaid 
is not to be discontinued or cut off merely because that 
statute is, in fact, being followed; and the consideration of 
the siblings' income is not going to affect the payment of 
Medicaid, And that is my understanding of the statute and 
regulations as to Medicaid, and that will be my ruling as to 
the payment of Medicaid payments. 
How, more specifically, is there anything else that I 
need to state rather than just the directions that the 602 
section is to be considered in determining family unit and that 
Medicaid payments ate not to be cut off in that consideration? 
How more specifically would you like this Court's order to read? 
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Or Does that take care of it? 
MR* CAGEt tout Honor, I Just have a question about 
how you wish us to proceed with the class. The class has not 
been certified at this point) and obviously, given your ruling, 
there would be some real problems with the class definition 
proposed by Plaintiff. And of course, there has been no 
evidence presented on any of the elements for class 
certification* 
THE COURT J Let me just ask you this question: In 
view of my interpretation of the statute and the Medicaid 
provisions, can my order be followed, assuming you're not going 
to appeal—I don't know whether you are or not—statewide, 
without actually the technical certifying of a class? In other 
words, can payments just be adjusted? I'm trying to think of 
another case that we had where we really did that, where we 
really didn't certify the class but where my decision just 
applied. That was a case involving Social Security payments of 
people who had retired from a second company. I don't know 
whether you were Involved In that case ot not* 
MR. CAGE: Must have been before my time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Must have been before your time. But I 
actually didn't certify the class. I just said from now on, 
the state shall follow the Court's rulings on this. 
Will that take care of this case, or do we have a lot 
of people that are owed Medicaid payments because of these 
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rulings? 
MR, LAWLORt I think it might be productive for us to 
have-an opportunity to confer to find out with regard to the 
Medicaid aspect of this case. You know, if we can work out an 
agreement about reinstating people and making those 
determinations! identifying that— 
THE COURT: And reconsidering of past refusal to pay 
Medicaid where it really falls under this situation. 
MR. LAWLORt I'd be willing to have to the burden put 
on us to come to the Court if we're not able to resolve things, 
say—either ask for a status conference or move for class 
relief if we're not able to work things out. I would like an 
opportunity to work it out* 
THE COURT: I think it could be worked out without 
actually certifying Is a class and sending notice and doing all 
the things that are going to cost both sides a lot of money. 
I'd just as soon save the taxpayers some money, quite frankly. 
MR. LAWLOR: I think making that effort would be 
productive. If we have problems, then we could come back to 
you. 
THE COURT: Can I have your assurance, Mr. Cage and 
Ms. Oates, that you will confer and try to reach, if you can— 
reach some sort of an agreement, because basically now you've 
been applying this statute, the 602(a)(38). Right? 
MR. CAGE: Yes, your Honor, all along. 
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THE COURT: So. nothing is going to have to be to done 
based on my ruling on that. The only adjustment is going to 
have to be as far as Medicaid is concerned. 
MR. LAWLORJ That's correct. 
MR. CAGE: Correct. 
THE COURT: Let's be very clear: From this date on, 
Medicaid payments shall be made in those cases; and the only 
thing you really have to confer on is what has happened in the 
i 
past* 
MR. LAWLOR: Yes. And one clarification is that the 
Cordelia—I would ask that the Court direct that the State of 
Colorado reinstate the Medicaid eligibility of the members of 
the Cordelia Salazar family. 
THE COURT: Is there any reason I shouldn't do that in 
view of my ruling? 
MR* CAGE: I think you've already done it, your Honor. 
17 ; MR. LAKLOR: I just want to make that clear. 
THE COURT: The Court specifically orders that the 
Salazar family's Medicaid be reinstated. 
Do we have that problem with Childress or with—What's 
the other family? 
MR. LAWLOR: That also the reinstatement be effective 
from the date that they were terminated. 
THE COURT: The Court will so order. It will be 
effective from the date they were terminated. Do we have any 
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problem with the Childress family? 
MR. CAGE: They have not been terminated at this point, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Medicaid has been continuing for the 
Childresses? 
MR. SOLEM: And they're under a state administrative 
ALJ action which interpreted differently DEFRA than you did, so 
they've not required to have the other two children in the unit. 
So I'm not sure exactly—I think that has to be worked out in— 
they've appealed that in state court and I think that has to be 
worked out there. 
THE COURT! You mean the two children that were 
included in the family unit under 602(a)(38) have not been 
included in the Medicaid unit? 
MR. SOLEM! They haven't been included in the AEDC 
filing unit, either. The state ALJ interpreted the state 
regulation to apply only to needy children. So we've got a 
little— 
THE COURT: That's just a— 
MR. CAGE: I don't think there is any problem in 
conjunction with your order. They're still receiving Medicaid 
and pursuant to your order—it hasn't been terminated—and 
they'll continue to receive it. 
MR. SOLEM: That's correct. 
THE COURT: NOW, what about the other family? 
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MR. CAGE: They haven't been terminated, your Honor. 
MR. LAWLOR: There is no problem, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you try to work it out. 
I'd like to somehow be able to close this case, and we're going 
to need a final judgment order to close it; and I can't do that 
6 -until hopefully you work it out. 
MR. LAWLORt I would suggest, Judge—and I can accept 
this burden to report to the Court on the progress in resolving 
this remaining aspect of relief within 30 days. 
THE COURT: I was going to hope you were going to say 
10. Do you really need 30 days to do it? We'll give you the 
time if you need to. By February—by February 12, which I 
think is 30 days. 
MR. LAWLOR: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Report; and would you please either send 
me something in writing or else if you need to talk to the 
Court, do so through Phil Brimmer, my law clerk. 
MR. LANLOR: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: And we're going to need a final judgment, 
as I say. 
Are there going to be be other issues to be decided? 
MR. LAWLOR: Attorneys fees, Judge. 
THE COURT: Let's see if we can have any motions for 
attorneys fees discussed prior to 30 days and see if you can 
come up with a stipulation on those, too. And if you can't, 
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I'll want—what I'll want at that 30-day period is a motion for 
attorneys fees supported by very excellent, terrific, explicit, 
detailed affidavits as to your time. 
MR. LAWLOR: I've got them. 
THE COURT: Ala the Ramos case. If you read the Ramos 
case, it says excrutiating detail. 
MR. LAKLOR: I've got terrific records, judge. 
THE COURT: That's what I want. And at that time, I 
think I would also like to see a suggested final order; and 
maybe you can talk about that between you, too, how you want it 
stated. 
I take it some of these cases that have been cited to 
me are up on appeal. 
MR. LAWLOR: They are, Judge. 
THE COURT: If not all of them. 
MR. CAGE: 1 understand that the Creaton case out of 
California is before the Ninth Circuit. 
MR. LAWLOR: Both Gorrle and White Horse are also 
pending in the Eighth Circuit. 
THE COURT: You may consider whether you want to 
appeal this or see what the other circuits do. That's up to 
you, but we need that tight final judgment before an appeal 
here. And I'll expect that also by the 12th, then. Everything 
is to be tied up by the 12th, hopefully, unless you have a 
problem; and if you do, then I'll meet with you and we'll 
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either hold a heating or try to resolve It. 
Anything else to put on the record? 
MR* CAGE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURTS Thank you very much Cor your attention to 
this matter* Court is in recess* 
(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded and the Court 
recessed at lit20 a.m.) 
• * * * * 
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